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TECHNICAL PROTECTION MEASURES FOR
DIGITAL AUDIO AND VIDEO: LEARNING FROM
THE FAILURE OF AUDIO COMPACT DISC
PROTECTION
Mark H.Lyon

t

Abstract
As consumers upgrade their computers, stereos and televisions
they are replacing analog technologies with digital ones. These new
technologies store information in a form that does not noticeably
degrade as it is duplicated and is not bound to a particularrecording
medium. As the Internet bandwidth availableto the average computer
user has increased,has become highly efficient to transmit and share
such data. Fearing enormous financial losses from widespread
piracy, content providers sought methods to protect their content via
technicalprotection measures ("TPMs').
Section I of this article provides a brief overview of technical
protection measures. Sections 11 and III review various forms of
technicalprotection measures that content providers have attempted
to employ in connection with audio compact discs. Section IIIfocuses
specifically on Sony BMG's MediaMax and XCP measures and the
resulting litigation. Section IV examines the new exceptions to the
DigitalMillennium Copyright Act's anti-circumvention rules. Section
V explores the future of technical protection measures for sound
recordings distributedon compact discs. Section VI looks atpotential
problems with technical protection measures in other digital media
formats. Finally, Section VII suggests ideas on how content providers
can avoid becoming the focus of the next copyright controversy.

t B.S. Mississippi College; candidate for J.D., Mississippi College School of Law, 2007. Lyon,
Plaintiff in Lyon v. Sony BMG, launched the website SonySuit.com to share information with
consumers related to litigation surrounding the 2005 Sony BMG Copy Protection Controversy.
The author expresses his gratitude to those who provided their valuable insight and comments,
including H. Lee Hetherington, Michael McCann, Gregory W. Bowman, and Kasey Nored.
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INTRODUCTION

I.

Consumers today are making enormous changes in the manner in
which they consume music, movies, and other forms of entertainment.
Increasingly, they are upgrading their computers, stereos, and
televisions to improve the quality of their personal entertainment
experience. Some are trading concerts and nights at the movie theater
for the personalized entertainment environment that can now be
created at home.' Unlike analog technologies, digital content does not
noticeably degrade as it is duplicated.2 Bits of data are not bound to
the particular recording medium. 3 Music stored on a compact disc can
easily be stored on a hard drive in a computer, on the flash memory of
the latest portable music player, and even backed up on digital tape
for archival purposes. 4
Internet bandwidth available to the average computer user has
increased, making it highly efficient to transmit and share data
through computer networks. One sale of a single compact disc in any
record store could result in literally hundreds or thousands of nearperfect digital copies, all duplicated without the consent or control of
the content producer or copyright holder. Fearing enormous financial
losses from widespread piracy, companies that rely upon the sale of
content sought methods by which they could protect their products.5
As the purchasers and users of digital content, regardless of the
delivery method, become exposed to new technology which allows
for the enjoyment of the latest movie or music, they will desire to

1. Maria Puente, The Multiplex is as Close as the Next Room; For Fans of "Big Rig"
Home Theaters, the Experience is Worth Every Cent, USA TODAY, Jan. 2, 2004, at 8D,
available at http://www.dickstaub.com/links view.php?record id=3968.
2.
CAREY LENIG, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ORDER
CODE RS22106, COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF DIGITAL TELEVISION: THE "BROADCAST FLAG" 2

(2005), fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/45183.pdf.
3.
See JEFF ROTHENBERG, COUNCIL ON LIBRARY AND INFORMATION RESOURCES,
AVOIDING TECHNOLOGICAL QUICKSAND: FINDING A VIABLE TECHNICAL FOUNDATION FOR
DIGITAL PRESERVATION § 5.1 (1998),

http://www.clir.org/PUBS/reports/rothenberg/contents.html.
4.

Robert Ashton, 1FPI Predicts Downloads Will Hit the Mainstream, MUSIC WEEK,

Jan. 29, 2005, at 6.
5. Recent studies indicate that the actual monetary loss from online, peer to peer digital
copying of music appears to be somewhat less than initially feared. Felix Oberholzer-Gee of the
Harvard Business School, in a study of 1.75 million downloads over a 17-week period in 2002,
noted that the relationship between file sharing and subsequent sales is "statistically
indistinguishable from zero." Beth Potier, File Sharing May Boost CD Sales, HARV. U.
GAZETTE, Apr. 15, 2004, available at http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2004/04.15/09filesharing.html.
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utilize their purchased content on a growing number of devices and in
a striking number of new and imaginative ways. 6 Technical protection
measures which limit the usefulness of content, or which force users
to purchase multiple copies of the same content, will in the future be
increasingly faced with user discontent. This results in diminished
market penetration and the promotion of alternative black markets of
easily accessible pirated content.
Technical protection measures, if used in moderation, can be an
effective method of limiting some forms of piracy. No technical
protection measure will provide complete protection from
unauthorized copying. Further, technical protection measures that
abuse the trust of the consumer stand a great risk of being exempted
from anticircumvention protection, opening up an entire class of
digital content distribution methods to exploit. This latter problem is
best demonstrated by the current state of technical protection
measures for audio compact discs.
II.

COMPACT DISC DIGITAL AUDIO

Phillips and Sony released the Compact Disc Digital Audio
specification, known as the Red Book, in June of 1980. 7 The
specification, which must be licensed from Phillips, outlines the
technical guidelines for the creation of interoperable audio compact
discs. 8 The Red Book standard
has no provision for any form of
9
technical protection measure.
While noncompliant, some content providers have attempted to
utilize compact discs designed to be generally compatible with the
Red Book, making them compatible with most standalone
commercial compact disc players, but which have errors or special
sections that make them unusable as audio discs on personal

6. The Sling Box, for example, is a hardware device that allows users to view and
control their home entertainment systems through a residential Internet connection and a remote
terminal such as a computer at work or a Windows Mobile PDA or Smartphone. See Sling
Media, http://slingmedia.com/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
7.
Wikipedia, Red Book (Audio CD Standard),

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RedBook_%28audioCD-standard%29
(last visited Apr. 13, 2007).

8.

Id.

9.
INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION, IEC 60908, AUDIO RECORDING COMPACT DISC DIGITAL AUDIO SYSTEM (1999).
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computers and other devices capable of making copies of the digital
audio content.l°
Phillips, in an effort to protect interoperability with Red Book
compliant devices of all types has restrained entities releasing
noncompliant discs from the use of their trademarked "Compact Disc
Digital Audio" logo." In some cases, the absence of this mark is the
sole indicator that a product sold on the same shelves and at the same
price as traditional audio compact discs is, in fact, something entirely
different. 12
Initial attempts at technical protection measures involved
creating "hybrid" discs that contained multiple individual segments,
known as "sessions."' 3 One of these sessions would act as a
traditional Red Book audio disc, while the remaining sessions
contained computer data.' 4 When inserted into the CD-ROM drive of
a typical computer, the device would ignore the audio portion of the
disc and instead direct users to the information stored in the computer
data session. 5 Some methods took the additional step of selectively
introducing errors into the audio session of the disc. 16
One of the earliest methods of such error introduction is the
Cactus Data Shield, released in late 1999.17 Audio, protected by the
Cactus Data Shield, played normally in the majority of commercial
standalone compact disc players, but when read by a device capable
of detecting the malformation, such as a computer CD-ROM drive,
would result in audio glitches.1 8 Malformation of the audio session
10. Tony Smith, EM] Admits CD Copy Protection Compatibility Problems, REG., Feb.
13, 2004, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/02/13/emiadmitscd-copyprotection/.
Bill Thompson, The Rootkit of all Evil?, BBC NEWS, Nov. 4, 2005,
11.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4406178.stm.
12. Will Knight, Philips Says Copy-Protected CDs Have No Future, NEW SCIENTIST,
Jan. 11,2002, available at http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn1783.
EVALUATING NEW
13.
J.ALEX HALDERMAN, PRINCETON U., DEP'T OF COMPUTER SCI.,
COPY-PREVENTION TECHNIQUES FOR AUDIO CDS § 4.1 (2002), availableat
http://www.cs.princeton.edu/-jhalderm/papers/drm2002.pdf
PREVENTION TECHNIQUES].
14.

[hereinafter HALDERMAN, COPY-

Id.See also Wikipedia, Cactus Data Shield,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CactusDataShield (last visited Apr. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Cactus
Data Shield].
HALDERMAN, COPY-PREVENTION TECHNIQUES, supra note 13, § 4.1. See also Cactus
15.
Data Shield, supra note 14.
16.

HALDERMAN, COPY-PREVENTION TECHNIQUES, supra note 13, §§ 4.2-4.3.

17.
18.

U.S. Patent No. 6,425,098 (filed Aug. 9, 1999).
Tia Hall, Music Piracy and the Audio Home Recording Act, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH.

REV. 23, 5 (2002), available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2002dltr0023.html.
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was largely discontinued due to incompatibility with some players
and the improved error-correcting capabilities of modem CD-ROM
drives, which could ignore errors introduced onto the disc.' 9
Later technical protection measures avoided intentional
corruption of the audio data and instead focused on the inclusion of
data tracks containing software that would be executed upon insertion
into Windows or Macintosh computers. 20 Generally the software
included on these discs would present an interface to the computer
user, which allowed them to access "bonus content" or pre-encoded
digital files that were protected against file sharing. 21 Some included
software would install programs on a user's computer to prevent
access to the audio portion of the disc. 22 Automatic execution23of the
included software could be disabled in both operating systems.
III. THE SONY BMG COPY PROTECTION CONTROVERSY
Sony BMG, one of the four largest music companies, began
including certain technical protection measures, known as MediaMax
and XCP in September 2003 and January 2005, respectively. 24 One of
the two software programs was included on over one hundred
25
different albums, with no identifiable pattern as to genre or artist.

HALDERMAN, COPY-PREVENTION TECHNIQUES, supra note 13, § 5.
J. ALEX HALDERMAN, PRINCETON U., DEP'T OF COMPUTER SC., ANALYSIS OF THE
MEDIAMAX CD3 COPY-PREVENTION SYSTEM § 3 (2003), available at
19.

20.

http://www.cs.princeton.edu/-jhalderm/cd3/ [hereinafter HALDERMAN, MEDIAMAX CD3 COPYPREVENTION SYSTEM].
Posting of Mike Snider to USA Today Tech,
21.
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techinnovations/2003-09-22-copycdx.htm
(Sept. 22, 2003, 15:04 EST).

22. Posting of J. Alex Halderman to Freedom to Tinker, MediaMax Permanently Installs
and Runs Unwanted Software, Even if User Declines EULA, http://www.freedom-totinker.com/?p=936 (Nov. 28, 2005, 14:23 EST) [hereinafter Halderman, MediaMax].
23.
One computer science student who noted that the execution of such programs could
be halted on Windows systems by simply holding down the left shift key while inserting a
protected CD was threatened with a lawsuit alleging that such instructions, published as
Princeton University Computer Science Technical Report TR-679-03, amounted

to

a

circumvention method prohibited by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. See Katie Dean,
Shift-Key Case Rouses DMCA Foes, WIRED, Oct. 11, 2003,
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,60780,00.html.
24. Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, 1 1, In re Sony BMG CD
Technologies Litigation, No. I:05-cv-09575-NRB (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.girardgibbs.com/sonyconsolidatedamendedcomplaint.pdf.
25.
Electronic Frontier Foundation, Sony BMG Settlement Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/Sony-BMG/settlement faq.php#3 (follow "How do I tell if I've
bought a Sony BMG CD with XCP or MediaMax software?" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 13,
2007).

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

648

[Vol. 23

The discs could be identified by their lack of the Phillips "Compact
Disc Digital Audio" logo, an additional block of text on the back
panel of the CD case which informed users that "[u]nauthorized
copying is punishable under federal law," and a short informational
box indicating compatibility with various players or computer
systems.2 6
A.

Software

Software was included and configured to begin running once 2it7
into the computer, utilizing a data session on the disc.
inserted
was
With both MediaMax
and XCP, the user would be confronted with a
"clickwrap, 28 end-user license agreement for the software and an
option to install the program in order to access the audio files or
digital content. 29 The software was presented as a music player that
would allow for protected digital copies of the songs on the disc to be
played on the PC and "authorized" portable media players.3a It would
additionally allow for a limited number of backup copies of the audio
disc to be made. 31 The software was described as being for the
protection of the audio files on the disc.32 The license agreement
indicated that the software could be removed, and that it would not
collect personal information33 .
Once the XCP or MediaMax software was installed it began to
continually operate on the user's computer, even when no compact
disc was inserted.34 The programs monitored all other similar music

26. Electronic Frontier Foundation, A Spotters' Guide to XCP and SunnComm's
MediaMax, http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/Sony-BMG/guide.php (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
27. CA Spyware Information Center, XCP.Sony.Rootkit,
http://www3.ca.com/securityadvisor/pest/pest.aspx?id=453096362 (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
28. See generally Garry L. Founds, Note, Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap Agreements: 2B or
Not 2B?, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 99 (1999).
29. Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 24,14.
30. The files would not work with the popular Apple iPod, which utilizes an incompatible
technical protection measure. Sony BMG Music Entertainment Frequently Asked Questions.
http://cp.sonybmg.com/xcp/english/faq.html#backup (follow "Making Backup Copies of the
Disc" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
31.
Id.
32. Exhibit "A" to Complaint, Lyon v. Sony BMG, No. 251-06-33-CV (Miss. Jud. Dist.
Hinds County Jan. 5, 2006), available at http://sonysuit.com/lyon/complaint.pdf.
33. Complaint, Lyon v. Sony BMG, No. 251-06-33-CV (Miss. Jud. Dist. Hinds County
Jan. 5, 2006), available at http://sonysuit.com/lyon/complaint.pdf.
34. Mark's Blog, Sony, Rootkits and Digital Rights Management Gone Too Far,
http://blogs.technet.com/markrussinovich/archive/2005/10/3 1/sony-rootkits-and-digital-rightsmanagement-gone-too-far.aspx (Oct. 31, 2005, 11:04 PST) [hereinafter Mark's Blog, Sony].
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discs, and could not be easily uninstalled.3 5 The method for removing
the programs, which required a user to submit personal information to
Sony BMG through their website, did not actually remove either
application.36 Further, the software contacted Internet servers operated
by Sony BMG, leaving information in the company's records
regarding the compact disc usage and listening habits of each user.37
The XCP version of these Sony BMG discs created a number of
security vulnerabilities in a user's Windows computer. These
vulnerabilities allowed not only the technical protection measure to
hide from users and prevent removal through the use of a "rootkit,, 38
but also allowed viruses or other malicious software to evade
detection by commercial anti-virus applications. 39 A security patch,
released after controversy arose regarding the use of XCP,
unintentionally opened additional vulnerabilities, which allowed
40
remote hackers to install software or reboot a computer at will.

More than two million infected discs were created.4 1
Some versions of the Sony BMG MediaMax discs installed their
software payload regardless of the user's selection of the "agree" or
"disagree" option when presented with the "clickwrap" end-user
license agreement.4 2 The patches and uninstall routines provided by
Sony BMG again opened further vulnerabilities on a user's
computer.4 3 The software was included on over twenty million discs
manufactured by or for Sony BMG.44

35.

Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 24,

36.

Id. 26.

37.

Id.

23-32.

38.
Bruce Schneier, Real Story of the Rogue Rootkit, WIRED, Nov. 17, 2005, http://wiredvig.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,69601,00.html. A rootkit is a set of tools designed to

conceal running programs or files from the operating system. See generally Bryce Cogswell &
Mark Russinovich, Microsoft TechNet, RootkitRevealer vl.71 (Nov. 1,2006),
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/sysinternals/utilities/RootkitRevealer.mspx.
See also Groklaw, EFF's Sony Complaint Includes MediaMax & Unconscionable EULA
Claims, http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story-20051121215116613 (Nov. 21, 2005,
22:23 EST) [hereinafter Groklaw, Sony Complaint].
39.

Groklaw, Sony Complaint, supra note 38.

40.

Schneier, supra note 38; Groklaw, Sony Complaint, supranote 38.

41.

Groklaw, Sony Complaint, supra note 38.

Halderman, MediaMax, supra note 22.
43.
Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 24,
Groklaw, Sony Complaint, supra note 38.
42.

44.

Groklaw, Sony Complaint, supra note 38.

23-32. See also
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B. Sony BMG's Response
Sony BMG had been alerted to the risks of their software on

September 30, 2005 and October 4, 2005 by anti-virus vendor FSecure, but those risks were not made public at that time.45 The risks
associated with XCP were first released publicly by Mark
Russinovich46 on October 31, 2005. 4 7 In his blog post, Russinovich
offered a highly technical description and examination of the Sony
BMG XCP rootkit. 48 Word quickly spread throughout the online
community. 49

Initially, Sony BMG was slow to respond to the concerns of
users. On November 4, 2005, during an interview with National
Public Radio's Morning Edition, Thomas Hesse, President of Sony
BMG's global digital business division asked: "Most people50 don't
even know what a rootkit is, so why should they care about it?"
Initially, users who requested the uninstaller tool from Sony
BMG's website were not provided with the tool they requested.5'
Calling Sony BMG at the phone numbers listed on their website
resulted in little assistance to users concerned about their safety and
security of their computers. 52 Nearly a month later, information on
removing the software was not available from Sony BMG, and the

45.
Steve Hamm, Sony BMG's Costly Silence, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Nov. 29, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2005/tc20051129_938966.htm.
46.
Mark Russinovich is a Technical Fellow in the Platform and Services Division at
Microsoft. He was the co-founder and Chief Software Architect of Wintemals Software, and has
written numerous administration and diagnostic utilities for the Microsoft Windows operating
system. For more information or to contact Mr. Russinovich, visit
http://blogs.technet.com/markrussinovich/about.aspx.
47.

Mark's Blog, Sony, supra note 34.

48.
See id.
49. See Posting of ScuttleMonkey to Slashdot, Sony DRM Installs a Rootkit?,
http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/10/31/2016223&tid=172&tid=158 (Oct. 31, 2005, 19:04
CST).
50.
Schneier, supra note 38. See also Audio Recording: National Public Radio, Sony
Music CDs Under Fire from Privacy Advocates (Nov. 4, 2005), availableat
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4989260.
51.
Affidavit of Mark Russinovich in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Final Approval of
Class Action Settlement, In re Sony BMG CD Technologies Litigation, No. I:05-cv-09575NRB (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2006), availableat
http://www.sonysuit.com/classactions/michaelson/71.pdf.
52.
See Posting of Marc Perton to Engadget, Sony To Let Antivirus Companies In On
DRM Code, http://www.engadget.com/2005/ll/02/sony-to-let-antivirus-companies-in-on-drmcode/ (Nov. 2, 2005, 16:10 EST).
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company had not taken effective steps to remove the discs from the
marketplace. 53
Dr. Larry Ponemon, in an affidavit for the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, estimated that 1.44 million computers were infected with
XCP or MediaMax, and determined the time lost by the class
members to have a value of up to $32.76 million dollars.5 4
C. Anti-Virus Vendor Response
It is important to note that a number of major anti-virus vendors
were aware of the Sony BMG XCP and MediaMax software, but took
no affirmative steps to correct its behavior. 55 No antivirus program
protected consumer's computers from malicious software hiding
under the protective cloak provided to it by the Sony BMG software.
Methods of removing the infection were 56delayed until long after the
dangers of the software were well known.
The anti-circumvention provision of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act 57 ("DMCA") was cited by researchers and anti-virus
vendors as the primary reason for not alerting users or providing
methods for removing or disabling the Sony BMG software before the
public became aware of the risks posed by Sony BMG's software.5 8
As a result, Sony BMG's XCP and MediaMax were allowed to
silently spread to at least 568,200
public, private, educational, and
59
military networks worldwide.
As previously noted, antivirus vendor F-Secure alerted Sony
BMG to the risks of their software on September 30, 2005 and
October 4, 2005.60 They did not, however, immediately offer a
53. Mark's Blog, Premature Victory Declaration,
http://blogs.technet.com/markrussinovich/archive/2005/11/30/premature-victorydeclaration.aspx (Nov. 30, 2005, 15:48 PST) [hereinafter Mark's Blog, Premature Victory
Declaration].
54. Declaration of Larry Ponemon in Support of the Ricciuti Class Representatives'
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and
Reimbursement of Expenses, In re Sony BMG CD Technologies Litigation, No. 1:05-cv-09575NRB (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2006).
55. Schneier, supra note 38.
56. Dan Kaminsky, Learningfrom Sony: An External Perspective, VIRUS BULL., Feb.
2006, at 8.
57. Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
58. Ann Broache & Declan McCullagh, Seeking Changes to the DMCA, CNET
NEWS.COM, March 31, 2006, http://news.com.com/Seeking+changes+to+the+DMCA/21007348_3-6056616.html.
59. DoxPara Research, Welcome to Planet Sony,
http://www.doxpa:-a.com/?q=/node/1 129 (Nov. 15, 2005, 9:28 PST).
60.

Hamm, supra note 45.
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method for removing XCP or MediaMax to their customers. 61 Instead,
they attempted to work with Sony BMG to correct the security risk.6 2
Those talks were still ongoing when Mark Russinovich released his
report.6 3
McAfee added detection code to their anti-virus utility on
November 9, 2005. 64 Instructions and methods for removing the XCP
software were made available by Sony BMG on December 6, 2005.65
The McAfee anti-virus application contains an option to allow the
Sony BMG software to remain on a computer,
warning users that they
66
may have a legal obligation to do SO.
Symantec released a utility on November 10, 2005 that removed
the "cloaking" feature from the Sony BMG software.6 7 Their utility
does not remove the program; it instead instructs users to update
infected computers with the latest version of the Sony BMG software
in lieu of removal with the following message:
WARNING: Removing this security risk manually may damage
the compromised computer's operating system and may violate the
manufacturer's end-user license agreement.
Symantec Security Response strongly recommends installing the
software update provided by the manufacturer. The latest version
removes the security risk from the compromised computer and
replaces it with an updated version of the XCP software. This
update is available at the following URL:
http://cp.sonybmg.com/xcp/english/updates.html. 68
Microsoft, whose Windows operating system could at times be
unstable when infected with the Sony BMG software, did not

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Schneier, supra note 38.
65. Posting of Cory Doctorow to Boing Boing, Sony *Finally* Releases Rootkit
Uninstaller - Sort Of, http://www.boingboing.net/2005/12/06/sonyfinally release.html (Dec. 6,
2006, 6:54 PST).
66. McAfee, XCP, http://vil.nai.com/vil/content/v_136855.htm (last visited Apr. 13,
2007).
67. Symantec, SecurityRisk.First4DRM, http://www.symantec.com/index.jsp
(search "Search All of Symantec" for "SecurityRisk.First4DRM";
then follow "SecurityRisk.First4DRM" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
68. Id.
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announce until November 13, 2005 that it would provide a tool to
remove the infection.69
D. Class Action Litigation
Dissatisfied with the response from Sony BMG, a number of
individual and class action lawsuits were filed throughout the United
States and other countries. 70 The majority of the US cases were
consolidated in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. 7'
Amongst the many class action claims were violations of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which prohibits accessing a
computer without, or in excess of, the authority granted by the owner
of the computer; common law trespass to chattels, and unfair or
deceptive business practices.7 2 In some states, most notably
California73 and Texas74 , claims included state causes of action
designed to prohibit "spyware" or other malicious software. 5
Once the matters were consolidated, Sony BMG's attorneys
worked quickly to reach a settlement. On December 28, 2005, Sony
BMG's attorneys and class counsel Scott Kamber submitted to the
court a motion requesting approval of a proposed settlement.76
The settlement provided for a replacement of infected discs.
Additionally, it offered the option of either $7.50 in cash and one
77
album download, or three album downloads with no cash incentive.
Consumers were allowed to select from a catalog of two hundred
albums from Sony BMG artists at several different music download

69. Joris Evers, Microsoft Will Wipe Sony's 'roolkit,' CNET NEWS.cOM, Nov. 13, 2005,
http://news.com.com/Microsoft+will+wipe+Sonys+rootkit/2100-1002_3-5949041 .html.
70.

See generally SonySuit.com, Class Action Lawsuits,

http://www.sonysuit.com/classactions/ (Nov. 30, 2005).
71.

Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 24.

72.

Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Computers, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22947.3 (West 2007).

73.

74. Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 48.053 (Vernon 2006).
75.
SecurityFocus, Sony BMG Settles Rootkit Lawsuits,
http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/390 (Dec. 21, 2006).
76.
Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Application for
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, In re Sony BMG CD Technologies Litigation,
No. 1:05-cv-09575-NRB (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2005), available at

http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/Sony-BMG/sonyprelimapproval-motion.pdf.
77.
Settlement Agreement, In re Sony BMG CD Technologies Litigation, No. 1:05-cv9575-NRB (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28. 2005), available at

http://www.sonybmgcdtechsettlement.com/pdfs/SettlementAgreement.pdf
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sites, including Apple's iTunes service. 78 The settlement was
approved by District Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald in 2006. 79
A number of State Attorneys General also filed consumer
protection or other related actions against Sony BMG.8 ° California
and Texas, 81 along with thirty-nine other states, settled their claims
with Sony BMG for approximately $4.25 million in fines and legal
fees in different actions in December of 2006.82 The settlements also
provided additional benefits to consumers, including up to a $175
payment to individuals who could demonstrate expenses for removing
the software from their computer, or a $25 payment to those who did
not retain such documentation, or who were able to remove the
infection themselves.83
IV. DMCA ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION EXCEPTIONS
The greatest fallout from the Sony BMG Copy Protection
Controversy was not the cost to the company or their damaged
reputation in the marketplace. The strongest impact would be felt one
year later, on November 27, 2006, when the Librarian of Congress
announced new classes of works exempt from the prohibition against
circumvention of technological protection measures controlling
access to copyrighted
works under the Digital Millennium Copyright
84
Act (DMCA).
The DMCA contains provisions that make the circumvention of
technical protection measures, no matter how poorly planned or

78.

Lorraine Woellert, Sony BMG Ends a Legal Nightmare, BUS. WK. ONLINE,

December 30, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/dec2005/tc20051230 658336.htm.
79. US JudgeApproves Sony Settlement, BBC NEWS, Jan. 12, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4602840.stm.
80. Press Release, South Dakota Attorney General, Attorney General Long Joins 39
Other States in Settlement with SONY BMG, (Dec. 21, 2006),
http://www.state.sd.us/attomrney/applications/documents/oneDocument.asp?DocumentID = 1051.
81.
Robert McMillan, Sony Pays $1.5M to Settle Rootkit Suits, INFOWORLD, Dec. 19,
2006, http://www.infoworld.com/article/06/12/19/1-Nrootkitsettle_ .html.
82. Posting of Paul Miller to Engadget, Sony BMG Plops Down $4.25 Million to Settle
with 39 States, http://www.engadget.com/2006/12/21/sony-bmg-plops-down-4-25-million-tosettle-with-39-states/ (Dec. 21, 2006, 16:42 EST).
83. Posting of Nate Anderson to Ars Technica, Texas, California Settle Sony BMG
Lawsuits; Consumers Win?, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20061220-8465.html (Dec. 20,
2006, 10:40 CST).
84. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,472 (Nov. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R.
pt. 201).
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implemented, punishable through civil and criminal action. 85 The civil
penalties applicable to § 1201 circumvention, an act which many
contend removing XCP or MediaMax to be, include a fine of not less
than $200 nor more than $2,500 for each act or offer of
circumvention. 86 Additionally, those who undertake § 1201
circumvention for "commercial advantage or private financial gain"
risk $500,000 fines and a maximum of 5 years imprisonment for the
first offense; double penalties apply for each subsequent
circumvention. 87 With the possibility of such serious repercussions, it
is understandable that antivirus vendors took a cautious stance when
approaching the removal or disabling of Sony BMG's technical
protection measures.
The new exceptions remain in effect until October 27, 2009.88
One directly addressed the Sony BMG Copy Protection Controversy.
It allowed the circumvention of technical protection measures
associated with:
6. Sound recordings, and audiovisual works associated with those
sound recordings, distributed in compact disc format and protected
by technological protection measures that control access to
lawfully purchased works and create or exploit security flaws or
vulnerabilities that compromise the security of personal computers,
when circumvention is accomplished solely for the purpose of
good faith testing, investigating, or correcting such security flaws
or vulnerabilities. 89
Opponents of the exception correctly noted that allowances were
already made in the DMCA "for the purpose of good faith testing,
investigating, or correcting, a security flaw or vulnerability, with the
authorization of the owner or operator of such computer, computer
system, or computer network." 90 In response, Marybeth Peters, the
United States Register of Copyrights, while making her office's
recommendation to the Librarian of Congress, noted that "while it
appears that this statutory exemption may permit circumvention in
cases such as those involving MediaMax and XCP, it is not clear

85. Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c)(3)(A) (2000).
87. 17 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (2000).
88. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, supra note 84.
89. Id. at 68,477.
90.

17 U.S.C. § 1201(j)(1) (2000).
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whether that provision extends to such conduct." 91 The Register of
Copyrights then recommended the exception for those legitimate
92
efforts to investigate or correct the security risks noted in § 1201 0).
While narrowly drawn, this exception effectively permits the
circumvention of almost every known form of technical protection
measure for audio compact discs. For a technical protection measure
to be effective, it must exert a level of control over the computer
system. Sony BMG's XCP software inserted pieces of software code
between the different portions of the operating system responsible for
accessing the CD-ROM drive. 93 When protected content was
detected, the injected code would provide false information to the
94
operating system.
Such operation relied upon an insecurity of the Microsoft
Windows device driver model, which allowed programs to install
software that would interfere with the correct operation of the CDROM drive. 95 Similar methods for providing independent security of
digital content will, by necessity, involve further exploitation of
vulnerabilities within the operating system in order to cause the
system to operate differently than intended. Almost any exploitation
of weaknesses in an operating system can lead to compromised
computer security.96 With the implementation of the above DMCA
exception, the viability of even marginally effective current
technological protection measures for audio recordings distributed via
the compact disc was totally eliminated.
V.

THE FUTURE OF TECHNICAL PROTECTION MEASURES
FOR SOUND RECORDINGS DISTRIBUTED IN COMPACT
DISC FORMAT

The Sony BMG Copy Protection Controversy and the resultant
DMCA exception signaled the end of the current phase of technical

91.
Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, supranote 84, at 68,477.

92.

Id.

93.
J. ALEX HALDERMAN & EDWARD W. FELTEN, PRINCETON U., DEP'T OF COMPUTER
SCI., LESSONS FROM THE SONY CD DRM EPISODE (2006), available at
http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/sonydrm-ext.pdf.
94.
See generally F-Secure, F-Secure Rootkit Information: XCP DRM Software,
http://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/xcp drm.shtml (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
95.
Posting of Edward W. Felten to Freedom to Tinker, CD DRM: Unauthorized
Deactivation Attacks, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=964 (Jan. 29, 2006, 9:44 EST).
96. JACK KOZIOL ET AL., THE SHELLCODER'S HANDBOOK: DISCOVERING AND
EXPLOITING SECURITY HOLES 105-214 (Wiley Publishing, Inc., 2004).
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protection measures included on audio discs. Consumer fear and
distrust of the music and antivirus industries helped to push
consumers away from protected discs. NVPI, the Dutch entity
responsible for the promotion and support of the music industry,
announced in January of 2007 that EMI, a major music label, was the
final label to remove technical protection measures from new audio
discs sold in their country.97

No such official announcement has been released by the
Recording Industry Association of America, but anecdotal reviews of
record store shelves indicate that a number of newer discs still contain
some limited forms of technical protection measures. 98 Increasingly,
the current form of technical protection measure involves the
insertion of a data session containing "bonus content" and/or
protected digital copies of the music on the disc, but no software
designed to prevent users from accessing or copying the Red Book
compliant portion of the audio disc. 99 The Recording Industry
Association of America has enacted a standards document that
requires such discs to be playable in any complaint compact disc
player. 100

The 2007 EMI Records release, Lily Allen - Alright, Still,101
contains one such data session of bonus content.' ° 2 Upon insertion of
the disc into a Windows computer, the disc launches an application
called "U-MYX" which allows users to create their own remix of two
songs from the album. 10 3 Users are allowed to selectively control the
vocals, background sounds, instrumentation, percussion, and other

97. Posting of Sander Marechal to LXer, DRM on Audio CD's Abolished,
http://lxer.com/module/newswire/view/78008/index.html (Jan. 9, 2007, 10:31 EST).
98. See CD Media World, CD/DVD Protections,
(last visited Apr. 13,
http://www.cdmediaworld.com/hardware/cdrom/cdprotections.shtml
2007).
99.

Generally, these compact discs are referred to in the marketplace as an "Enhanced

CD" and are available from a number of different record labels.
100.
Recording Industry Association of America, Issues: Standards
http://www.riaa.com/issues/audio/standards.asp (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).

101.

and

Coding,

This modem musical release is available at http://www.amazon.com/Alright-Still-

Lily-AlIendp/B000FMGWRS.
Posting of Jim Welte to MP3.com, Lily Allen Beefs Up Album for US Release,
102.
http://www.mp3.com/news/stories/8060.html (Jan. 11, 2007, 15:29 PST).
103.

U-MYX, About U-MYX, http://www.u-myx.com/About/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
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aspects of the songs. 10 4 Users are able to access and play the audio
portion of the disc independent of the included software.' 0 5
Such "added value" content is growing in popularity as a
replacement for more draconian technical protection measures.
Additional content provides a mechanism by which users can become
more familiar with the artist or explore more of the content they
enjoy. Further, the additional data session somewhat complicates the
process of duplicating the disc for the casual user while at the same
time offering an additional benefit to users who purchase the disc.
Because the included software does not attempt to monitor or control
the consumer's computer, users can be assured that the risk of
exploitation or the creation of security vulnerabilities is minimal.
At the current time, the market does not appear to be prepared to
accept strict technical protection measures on audio discs. Continued
and increased inclusion of bonus content may serve to help overcome
the negative effects of the Sony BMG XCP and MediaMax software,
and may lead the way for more effective and secure technical
protection measures that may later be developed.
VI. POTENTIAL FOR SIMILAR PROBLEMS WITH OTHER
TECHNICAL PROTECTION MEASURES IN OTHER
FORMS OF DIGITAL MEDIA
The widespread distribution of news regarding Sony BMG's
rootkit helped inform consumers of the harm that could result from
poorly designed or implemented technical protection measures, and
sparked considerable debate about technical protection measures in
other forms of content, such as downloadable
music and next06
discs.'
video
definition
high
generation
Consumer discontent over the risks revealed by the Sony BMG
Copy Protection Controversy may help to drive future concerns about
technical protection measures that remove control of a consumer's
equipment from their hands. With the growing adoption of high
definition televisions, digital broadcast radio, and other new
technologies, content providers are at a new crossroads where hard
choices regarding technological protection measures must be made.
104. Examples of remixed versions of songs from the disc are available at
http://www.u-myx.com/Music/Lily-Allen/Smile/.
105. For further information about the U-MYX software, and a demonstration video, visit
http://www.u-myx.com/About/.
106. See generally Electronic Frontier Foundation, Digital Rights Management and Copy
Protection Schemes, http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM! (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
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A. Digital Video Disc and High Definition Television
The now-familiar Digital Video Disc (DVD) is changing to meet
the increased demands of consumers for high definition content.
Traditional DVDs, introduced in the 1990s, 10 7 can hold a large
amount of video and audio information, but lack the capacity needed
to provide high definition content. 10 8 Their primary technical
protection measures, the Content Scrambling System and Region
Coding, have proven ineffective when faced with inventive
programmers who have created software capable of decoding the
protected content without properly licensed software or access
keys. 109

New disc formats, such as the HD DVD and the Blu-ray Disc,
offer much greater data capacities, allowing for high-definition video
to be stored in the same form factor as a traditional DVD. 110 These
disc formats have been designed with new technical protection
measures, including systems to ensure that unencrypted digital output
cannot be captured through the use of untrusted hardware or
software."' These systems rely on a secure signal transport system
from the disc player to the output device such as a television or
computer monitor. 112 With these systems, content providers can
choose to degrade the quality of the signal if the transmission path
cannot be verified as secure. t 3 Errors in the verification process have
caused some consumers to experience degraded performance who

107. CED Magic, 1997: DVD Achieves a Nationwide Market,
http://www.cedmagic.com/history/rca-dvd-rc5200p.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
108. CNET Reviews, Blu-ray, HD-DVD, and DVD Formats Compared,
http://reviews.cnet.com/4520-6463_7-646251 l-2.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
109. Posting of Patrick Gray to ZDNet, 'DVD Jon' to Seek Compensation,
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-5148882.html (Jan. 28, 2004, 6:22 PST).
110. Posting of Ryan Block to Engadget, Blu-ray vs HD DVD: State of the Division,
http://www.engadget.com/2005/09/19/blu-ray-vs-hd-dvd-state-of-the-s-union-s-division/ (Sept.
19, 2005, 14:10 EST).
111.
Posting of Ken Fisher to Ars Technica, HDCP: Beta Testing DRM on the Public?,
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070121-8665.html (Jan. 21, 2007, 19:24 CST).
112.

SCOTT CROSBY ET AL.,

A CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE HIGH-BANDWIDTH

SYSTEM, ACM-CSS8

DIGITAL

DRM WORKSHOP OF NOVEMBER 5, 2001,
available at http://apache.dataloss.nl/-fred/www.nunce.org/hdcp/hdcp 111901 .htm.
113. Posting of Eric Dahl to PC World, Sony, Others Won't Degrade HD Content on
Analog Outputs, http://blogs.pcworld.com/staffblog/archives/001657.html (Mar. 13, 2006, 17:06
CONTENT PROTECTION

PST).
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14
have done nothing to disturb the security of the transmission path."
At least one security researcher has alleged that these technical
protection measures may have serious fundamental flaws that
undermine their effectiveness, but has not published his results due to
fears of legal action."15
Newer versions of some operating systems, such as Microsoft's
Vista operating system, include such technical protection measures
for high definition content."' 6 This protection does not rely on outside
software, but instead utilizes software and hardware pre-installed on a
user's computer by the operating system manufacturer. 17 To facilitate
this security, many computer systems of even recent vintage are not
capable of displaying high definition content, as their hardware is not
trusted by the operating system to enforce copy protection."' The
software and hardware involved in performing these tasks limits the
control that users can exert over their computer systems, and has been
rejected as draconian by some consumers.'l9
If the scope of the audio disc anti-circumvention exception were
expanded to include all technological protection measures that create
or exploit security flaws or vulnerabilities that compromise the
security of personal computers, it may be quickly found that the
additional code necessary to implement even such embedded
protection measures could cause such methods to be subject to
circumvention. Further, even with these new protection methods, the
ability of individuals wishing to defeat such systems has not been
of both
abated. As of January 2007, the technical protection measures
0
the HD DVD and the Blu-ray Disc have been defeated.12

114. Steve Kindig, Senior Editor, Crutchfield Advisor, The Ins and Outs of HDMI: The
Essential Connection for High-Definition Home Theater,
http://www.crutchfieldadvisor.com/leamingcenter/home/hdmi.html?page=3 (last visited Apr.
13, 2007).
115.

Niels Ferguson, CensorshipIn Action: Why I Don't Publish My HDCPResults, MAC

FERGUS, Aug. 15, 2001, http://www.macfergus.com/niels/dmca/cia.html.
116. Posting of Ken Fisher to Ars Technica, On Windows Vista, DRM, and New
Monitors, http://arstechnica.com/articles/paedia/hardware/hdcp-vista.ars (Aug. 21, 2005, 21:45
CST).
Id.
117.
118.
Jonathan Richards, High-QualityDVDs Will Not Operate on Some Vista PCs, TIMES
ONLINE, Jan. 8, 2007,

http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech-and web/personaltech/article1290451.ece.
119. Posting of Edward N. Albro & Eric Dahl to Digit, The Most Annoying Things About
Windows Vista, http://www.digitmag.co.uk/blogs/index.cfm?entryid=238&blogid=2 (Feb. 20,
2007).
120. Posting of John Leyden to The Register, Blu-Ray DRM Defeated,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/23/blu-raydrmcracked/ (Jan. 23, 2007, 17:39 GMT).
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B. DigitalDownloads
Digital download services are divided into two different
categories, those that offer a per-item purchase model and those that
offer a subscription-based model. 121 In the per-item model, users pay
for each and every download, which they then expect to operate in
perpetuity. 22 With the subscription model downloads may be
unlimited or limited to a certain number of downloads per time
period, and users are allowed use of the downloaded content for as
long as they continue to pay for their subscription. 123
Technical protection measures have created the market for the
subscription-based model. Such measures, including those developed
by Microsoft, Real Networks, and Apple, allow for the verification of
the right to access content over the Internet, and for the revocation of
access at will. 124 While these systems are vulnerable to exploit, the
effort involved in removing the protection measures from the
downloaded files is often outweighed by the minimal recurring cost to
maintain the subscription.
Per-item downloads are often protected with a technical
protection measure that ties their playback to those devices and
computers owned by an individual. 25 Many consumers who are
hesitant to purchase protected digital downloads are attracted to the
prospect of the convenience26 and flexibility that is offered by
unprotected digital download.
On February 6, 2007, Steve Jobs, CEO of Apple, published an
open letter indicating a desire for record companies to allow his
popular iTunes music service to remove its technical protection
measures and offer unprotected music downloads. 127 Jobs, writing

121.

Albert Lin, Understanding the Market for Digital Music, 4 STAN. UNDERGRADUATE

REs. J. 50, 53 (2005).
122. See iTunes Store Terms of Sale, http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/sales.html (last
visited Apr. 13, 2007).
123. See generally Napster, http://www.napster.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
124. See generally Windows Media, Digital Rights Management (DRM),
http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowsmedia/forpros/drm/default.mspx (last visited Apr.
13, 2007).
125. Posting of Jefferson Graham to USA Today Tech, Closed Systems Leave Song
Buyers Out In The Cold, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/products/2006-10-15-music-warx.htm
(Oct. 15, 2006, 20:07 EST).
126. Posting of Jefferson Graham to USA Today Tech, EMI in Talks to Dump Copy
Protection, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2007-02-12-emi-copy-protection-x.htm (Feb.
12, 2007, 12:11 EST).
127. Steve Jobs, Chief Executive Officer, Apple, Thoughts on Music (Feb. 6, 2007),
http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic/.
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about digital rights management ("DRM"), the technical protection
measure utilized by iTunes, said:
In 2006, under 2 billion DRM-protected songs were sold
worldwide by online stores, while over 20 billion songs were sold
completely DRM-free and unprotected on CDs by the music
companies themselves. The music companies sell the vast majority
of their music DRM-free, and show no signs of changing this
behavior, since the overwhelming majority of their revenues
depend on selling CDs which must play in CD players that support
no DRM system.
So if the music companies are selling over 90 percent of their
music DRM-free, what benefits do they get from selling the
remaining small percentage of their music encumbered with a
DRM system? There appear to be none. If anything, the technical
expertise and overhead required to create, operate and update a
DRM system has limited the number of participants selling DRM
protected music. If such requirements were removed, the music
industry might experience an influx of new companies willing to
invest in innovative new stores128and players. The music companies
can only see this as a positive.

Drawbacks of technical protection measures in downloaded
content are primarily device lock-in and the related problem of
portability.12 9 Individual tracks on the iTunes music service cost
$0.99.130 Assuming that a user purchased just three tracks per month,
spending $2.97 per month, she could quickly amass a collection of
music valued at $71.28 in just two years. Such an amount rivals the
31
cost of many music players, including Apple's own iPod shuffle.1
Consumers who choose to purchase a competing music player may
find themselves unable to listen to their content on the new devices.
Consumers who choose to remain with the iTunes platform will also
soon find that their purchases are limited to activation on but five

128.

Id.

129. Michael Geist, 30 Days of DRM - Day 06: Interoperability (Public Protection and
Markets) (Aug. 24, 2006), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/l 383/195/.
130. Posting of Marc Perton to Engadget, Apple's iTunes Pricing to Stay at 99 Cents,
http://www.engadget.com/2006/04/21/apples-itunes-pricing-to-stay-at-99-cents/ (Apr. 21, 2006,
10:14 EST).

131. The iPod Shuffle retails for $79 on Apple's own website. See Apple, iPod Shuffle,
http://www.apple.com/ipodshuffle/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
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devices, limiting their ability to listen to their purchased content in
multiple locations. 132
Steve Jobs accurately understands the need to loosen restrictions
on digital downloads. Continually burdening legitimate consumers
with usage restrictions on purchased content will not attract the
majority of consumers, especially when unprotected content is
available at a comparable or lesser price. Digital content delivery
gains its greatest benefit from convenience and immediacy. Users
who find that they are not allowed to enjoy their purchased content in
the manner or method they so choose will simply select another
method of purchase, such as unprotected audio CDs, or will seek to
obtain the content in violation of the content producer's rights,
through peer-to-peer or other black market channels, if the latter
options present less difficulty for the content-seeking consumer.
VII. AVOID BECOMING THE FOCUS OF THE NEXT COPY
PROTECTION CONTROVERSY
The Sony BMG Copy Protection Controversy resulted in a
serious change in the landscape for technical protection measures.
Moving forward, it is important that entities understand and examine
the technical, legal, and business mistakes that were made, to ensure
that if their organization is placed in a similar situation they react
more effectively and favorably to the demands of their consumers.
Content providers should keep several considerations in mind when
selling protected content to guard against the risks of technical
protection measures that could adversely impact the sales of content.
First and foremost, the presence of a technical protection
measure and any restrictions imposed should be fully and accurately
explained to the customer, both before purchase and before
installation. In some business models, such as the subscription digital
download, the presence of a software component is a necessary
requirement for the function of the service. Some content, because of
the inclusion of a technical protection measure, may be offered at a
lower cost than unprotected versions of the same content. In such
cases, it is important that consumers understand which rights,
including the various "fair use" rights, which will or will not be
granted to the content. Consumers should be able to easily access
resources that will explain what they should expect, and if the

132.
Apple, About iTunes Store Authorization and Deauthorization,
http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=93014 (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
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protective measure is installed on their computer or other equipment,
the installation should not be hidden from the consumer's view.
Consumers who desire to return digital content during a short period
of time following their purchase due to problems, errors, or technical
difficulties should be offered refunds. Exchanges of digital content
returned for these reasons is an inadequate solution, as replacement
content will likely not be available with alternative technical
restrictions.
Furthermore, the customer should explicitly authorize any
communication by the technical protection measure to a remote
system before that communication occurs. Preferably, the
authorization should happen at the time of the communication.
Information gathered by the technical protection measure should not
be retained for a longer period than necessary for the operation of the
protection measure, and should not be used to compromise the
confidentiality of the customer. As our lives are increasingly
computerized, many consumers fear the loss of control over their
personal information. Even information as simple as the preference
for rap over country music could be a detail that a consumer would
desire to keep private. Unnecessary communication should be
avoided, and communication with remote systems should be governed
by a clear privacy policy, with the reason for the communication
clearly explained to the consumer.
When possible, interoperable technical protection measures
should be utilized. By allowing users the freedom and flexibility to
use their purchased or rented content, across multiple devices from a
wide range of manufacturers, would reduce the "lock in" experienced
by users of many current systems, and could help overcome some
objections by those unwilling to purchase protected content.
Any installed technical protection measure must be capable of
being fully and completely removed at will by the customer. The lack
of a clear and accessible removal method was the primary pitfall of
Sony BMG's XCP and MediaMax. The temptation to disable removal
functionality is certainly great, as an uninstalled technical protection
measure is no protection at all, but it is important to consider that the
software is installed on a device owned by the consumer, not the
content provider. Offering clear warnings that protected content will
not be accessible after removal is certainly an acceptable step, but
should be the only impediment to the consumer's decision to uninstall
any added software.
Additionally, Sony BMG's XCP and MediaMax demonstrated
that technical protection measures could inadvertently create security
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flaws or vulnerabilities that could compromise the security of
personal computers. All software included with content should be
tested, verified, and publicly certified by at least one independent
testing agency. Such independent analysis and certification would add
a trivial cost to most major technical protection measures, but would
offer a level of comfort and protection for both the consumer and the
content provider.
Finally, content providers should carefully examine the actual
risks and benefits to be experienced by offering some or all of their
content without technical protection measures. History has
demonstrated that technical protection measures will be compromised
nearly as fast as they can be created, and that they rarely impact
commercial piracy. Watermarking and other source verification
methods may provide an effective tool for the tracking of digitally
obtained content. This method can help prevent unauthorized file
sharing, since the source of a shared file can be identified, while at the
same time allowing consumers to personally use their purchased
content in any lawful manner they choose. The time, effort, and
resources that must be devoted to the creation of protection measures
may be better dedicated to bringing new and exciting content to the
marketplace.
Missteps will be made in the development and implementation
of future technical protection measures. Most of these failures will be
minor, and easily corrected. Some, however, may not be so benign. It
is important that entities implementing technical protection measures
learn from the failures of Sony BMG. Organizations can limit their
potential for becoming the focus of the next copy protection
controversy by providing advance notice to consumers of the
potential risk, carefully crafting a design and implementation strategy
that respects the consumer and their equipment, and by working
quickly to communicate and correct any vulnerabilities as they are
discovered.
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